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This paper analyzes the industrial growth of Korea in the 1990s and its 
relationship with the nation's export performance. The result shows that total factor 
productivity (TFP) played a significant role in the growth of some industries, where 
in particular a sharp increase in TFP was observed in the electrics and electronics 
industry and the automobile industry in the late 1990s. While CEPII RCA indexes 
for the Korean industries such as IT industry and automobile industry significantly 
increased since 1998, only limited evidence was found that TFP or TFI influenced 
RCA. Investigating Korea's export performance in the Northeast Asian context, this 
paper shows that, in the 1990s, the growth of Korea's exports to Japan was led by 
industries that recorded relatively fast growth in total factor input (TFI). In contrast, 
that to China was almost equally contributed by industries that experienced 
relatively fast growth in TFP or TFI. This paper also investigates competition 
between Korea and China, and Korea and Japan in the world market. The 
competition between Korea and China was relatively stronger for the Korean 
industries to whose growth TFI made a more significant contribution. While no 
decisive evidence is found for the relationship between TFP growth in Korean 
industries and their competition against Japan in the world market, it is revealed that 
the competition between Korea and Japan became less intense for the Korean 
industries to whose growth TFI made a stronger contribution. In this regard, the 
paper supports the view of 'nut-cracking' that the Korean economy has lost its 
competitiveness in the sectors where it maintained comparative advantage, but 
failed to catch up more advanced countries such as Japan by gaining competitiveness 
in more capital or technology intensive sectors.
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1990년대의 한국경제는 여러 가지 극적인 변화를 경험하였다. 가장 극적
이었던 경제위기와 그로부터의 회복에 가려지기 쉽지만, 우리 경제가 겪은 가
장 중요한 변화 중의 하나는 총요소생산성이 산업성장의 주요 동력으로 자리
매김한 것이다. 본 연구는 이 기간 동안의 산업성장동력의 변화가 무역성과에 
미친 영향을 특히 한국-중국-일본의 구도 속에서 분석한다. 무역성과의 분석
을 위해서는 산업별 수출성과, CEPII 현시비교우위지수, 경합도 등이 사용되
었다. 분석결과, 한국이 거의 모든 산업, 특히 노동집약적인 분야에서는 중국
의 추격을 허용한 반면, 자본집약적이거나 기술집약적인 부문, 즉 총요소생산
성의 증가가 성장을 주도한 산업에서는 일본을 극히 제한된 부문에서만 따라
잡는 것으로 나타나, 저간에 회자되는 ‘nut-cracking’의 우려가 1990년대부터 
발생하였음을 보이고, 이로부터 벗어나는 것이 더 이상 미룰 수 없는 심각하
고 시급한 과제임을 역설한다.    .
ABSTRACT
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I. Introduction 
 
 
Korea has been one of the most important players in Asia since the 
early 1960s, contributing to the world’s economic growth and dyna-
mism. While each and every stage in the Korean economy’s develop-
ment process since the early 1960s has been dramatic, one of the most 
significant turning points of the Korean economy was the ambitious 
launching of the heavy and chemical industry oriented policy by the 
government in 1972. This policy of encouraging six strategic indus-
tries - steel, petrochemicals, non-ferrous metals, shipbuilding, elec-
tronics and machinery - has been criticized for having distorted mar-
kets. Nevertheless, it is also observed that the industries protected or 
subsidized by this policy grew up to lead the nation’s economic 
growth, at least up to the crisis in 1997.  
While the Korean economy recorded remarkable growth until 1997, 
Kim (2001) and Kwack (2001) point out that the economy in fact had 
lost its competitiveness in the run up to the outbreak of the economic 
crisis, through unnecessary compromise of the Roh government 
(1988-1993) over the demands of workers. They also argue that large-
scale economic reform without prudent economic considerations by 
the successive Kim government (1993-1998) worsened the situation. 
As a result, costs such as material costs, labor costs, and borrowing 
costs had been consistently increasing, which was accompanied with a 
substantial increase in the unit value of exporting goods until 1995 
(Tcha and Lee, 2003). KDI’s (2003) study on the competitiveness of the 
Korean industries also revealed that total productivity of Korean in-
dustries during the first half of the 1990s fell short of that before and 
after the period.  
The 1990s was a period of storm and stress for the Korean econ-
omy. Though the economy faced various challenges, it broke through 
US$10,000 of GDP per capita entering a new era, joined the OECD, but 
shortly after, was engulfed in a crisis. Nonetheless, the years of 1999 
and 2000 demonstrated unprecedented recovery from the crisis. This 
paper investigates the Korean economy during this critical period, in 
particular, concentrating on growth of the industry and changes in 
certain aspects of trade. In analyzing the aspects of trade, the nation’s 
relationship with China and Japan is particularly focused.          
Section II of this paper analyzes the structural changes in the in-
dustries by concentrating on their growth. In particular, based on 
growth accounting, the contribution of total factor inputs (TFI) and 
total factor productivity (TFP) to growth is analyzed for 17 manufac-
turing sectors using the KDI multisectoral data. Section III discusses 
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structural changes in trade in the 1990s. Revealed comparative advan-
tage (RCA) indexes developed by Centre d? Etudes Prospectives et 
d? Information Internationales (CEPII) are calculated for each indus-
try to find structural changes in relative advantage of the nation. In 
addition, the export similarity index (ESI) is used to discuss competi-
tion between Korea, China and Japan in the world market. The evolu-
tion of the nation? s export pattern during this period is also dis-
cussed. The findings from Sections II and III are integrated in Section 
IV. The relationship between growth of TFI and TFP, and certain as-
pects of trade ?  RCA and ESI ?  in each industry is analyzed. Fur-
ther, it is investigated whether each industry? s RCA and its experi-
ence of competition against Japan and China is inter-related. The ma-
jor findings in this study are consistent with Heckscher-Ohlin Crowd-
ing Hypothesis (Leamer and Lunborg, 1995), which is well known as 
"nut-cracking" effect in more popular terms. Heckscher-Ohlin Crowd-
ing Hypothesis explains the situation where one economy is caught 
up by late-comers and loses comparative advantage for the sectors 
that it conventionally maintained comparative advantage, and at the 
same time, cannot construct strong comparative advantage for more 
advanced sectors. This study confirms that in general, the competition 
between Korea and China was getting severe in the sectors where Ko-
rea traditionally possessed comparative advantage, but Korea failed 
to gain competitiveness against Japan in the sectors where Japan 
maintained comparative advantage.  The paper concludes with Sec-
tion V. 
 
 
?. The Changes in Industrial Structure in Korea?
 
 
1. The Changes in Industrial Structure - Overview   
 
In 1990, as reported in Table 1, Korea’s total GDP was 178,797 bil-
lion won (nominal), where the contribution from manufacturing 
reached 55,681 billion won, or 31.1% of GDP.1 This fell slightly to 
about 30.9% of GDP in 1992 and remained stably within the range of 
30-31% until 1997. The year of 1998 witnessed a rapid growth in 
manufacturing, and the sector bounced back to explain more than 32% 
of GDP, producing 156,877 billion won.  
While manufacturing stably explained about 30-32% of GDP 
throughout the period of the 1990s, some dramatic changes in the 
structure inside of the manufacturing sector was observed. The most 
prominent change is, as shown in Table 1, the sharp decrease in the 
????????????????????????????????????????????
1 Most figures used in this paper are from KDI (2003) unless otherwise informed.  
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share of textile & apparel (T&A) in manufacturing which fell from 
10.7% in 1990 to 4.3% in 2000. The value of product from this industry 
during the period in fact increased until 1994 in both nominal and real 
terms, nevertheless, the industry’s growth rate was far behind that of 
the entire manufacturing sector, subsequently shrinking relative to 
other industries. Similarly, the chemical products and automobile in-
dustries experienced slight decreases in their shares during the period, 
which respectively ranged about 11-13% and 8-10% of the entire 
manufacturing. General machinery explained about 7.6% of manufac-
turing on average, and maintained a share of 7-8% throughout the 
period, ending up with 7.2% in 2000. The electric & electronics (E&E) 
industry, which contains four sub-industries – semiconductors, elec-
tronics and parts (E&P), IT equipments and home appliances – experi-
enced the most dramatic increase in product value and share. The in-
dustry produced 7,956 billion won or 14.3% of manufacturing in 1990, 
which increased by more than four times to reach 32,663 billion won 
or 18.5% of manufacturing in 2000.  
In summary, the total value of products and shares increased for 
all five major manufacturing industries2, except for T&A, for which 
the share rapidly decreased. The share of E&E increased most signifi-
cantly, and the shares for the remaining three industries – chemical 
products, general machinery and automobiles - were by and large 
maintained or slightly declined with mild fluctuations. 
Looking inside of E&E revealed that the four sub-industries in this 
category experienced different growth patterns. For example, semi-
conductor industry grew more than seven folds for five years since 
1990, and explained 5.8% of manufacturing products in 1995. Since 
then, growth has been retarded and the share has fallen to 3.8% in 
2000. The growth of IT equipment showed an opposite trend. Larger 
than the semiconductor industry by almost four times in 1990, despite 
the rapid growth, its size fell behind semiconductors industry in 1995, 
accounting for 5.7% of manufacturing output. However, the industry 
grew very rapidly in late 1995, and regained its position as the largest 
E&E sub-industry in 2000, with a share of more than 49% in E&E or 
9.2% of manufacturing. E&P and home appliances also recorded sub-
stantial growth during the period, however, their growth rates were 
lower than the other two industries, and subsequently their shares in 
total manufacturing were relatively stable. 
????????????????????????????????????????????
2 These five major industries include T&A, E&E, chemical products, general machinery and 
automobile industries as shown in Table 1. As E&E in turn disaggregates into four industries, 
these five major industries are in fact eight industries in the classification by the KDI (2003). 
They explained major portions of employment, total output and exports throughout the 1990s.  
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<Table 1> Total Product and Manufacturing Share for Major Indus-
tries in Korea 
(unit: billion won, %) 
 1990 1995 2000 
Textile & Apparel 5,979 7,833 7,549 
 (10.7) (6.7) (4.3) 
Chemical Products 7,422 15,057 20,232 
 (13.3) (12.9) (11.5) 
General Machinery 4,147 9,385 12,798 
 (7.4) (8.1) (7.2) 
Electricity & Electronics 7,956 19,221 32,663 
 (14.3) (16.5) (18.5) 
Semiconductors 947 6,775 6,642 
 (1.7) (5.8) (3.8) 
Electronics & Parts 2,837 5,271 8,428 
 (5.1) (4.5) (4.8) 
IT Equipment 3,690 6,582 16,155 
 (6.6) (5.7) (9.2) 
Home Appliances 482 593 1,438 
 (0.9) (0.5) (0.8) 
Automobiles 5,675 11,787 14,486 
 (10.2) (10.1) (8.2) 
Others 24,502 53,200 88,806 
 (44.0) (45.7) (50.3) 
Total Manufacturing (A) 55,681 116,483 176,534 
 (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) 
GDP (B) 178,798 377,350 521,959 
A/B (31.1) (30.9) (33.8) 
Source : Rearranged from KDI (2003). 
Notes : Numbers in parentheses are the manufacturing share of each industry. 
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2. Total Factor Inputs (TFI) and Total Factor  
Productivity (TFP) 
  
In conventional economic analysis of economic growth, total out-
put is determined by a combination of factors, in particular, capital 
and labor. Therefore, the growth of output is contributed by the 
growth of factor inputs and total factor productivity. Total factor pro-
ductivity used in this paper is obtained from KDI (2003), where each 
manufacturing industry’s TFP was calculated based on growth ac-
counting. 
According to Solow (1957) and Griliches (1994), the objective of 
growth accounting is to break down the growth rate of aggregate out-
put into contributions from the growth of inputs and the growth of 
technology. Using a conventional neoclassical production function, 
this aggregate relationship at time t is, 
 
Y(t) = A(t) · F[K(t), L(t)],  
 
where Y is output3, A(t) is and index of the level of technology, or 
is called total factor productivity (TFP)4, and K and L represent capital 
and labor respectively. To take logarithms of both sides and time de-
rivatives produces the growth rate of aggregate output, 
 
/ / K LAF AFY Y A A K L
Y Y
⋅ ⋅ ⋅⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + ⋅ + ⋅⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
⋅
, 
 
where  stands for changes in X over time, and FX& i means the  
first order derivative of F with respect to input i (i = K, L). Therefore 
AFi is the marginal product of input i. Multiply and divide the expres-
sion in the first set of brackets by K and the expression in the second 
set of brackets by L to obtain 
 
/ / ( / ) ( /K LAF K AF LY Y A A K K L L
Y Y
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + ⋅ + ⋅⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ )
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.  
 
If the factor markets are competitive, then the marginal product of 
each input equals its factor price, so that AFK equals the rental rate on 
capital, R, and AFL equals the wage rate, w. Therefore, the term 
?
3 Total value added was used as Y in KDI (2003). 
4 To simplify the algebra, it is assumed that technology is Hicks neutral (or output augment-
ing).  
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AFKK/Y is the share of the rental payments to capital in total income, 
and the expression (AFLL)/Y is the share of wage payments to labor in 
total income. 
Under the assumption of constant returns to scale, the capital share 
and the labor share add to 1 (AFKK/Y + AFLL/Y = 1). If α(t) is the capi-
tal share (= AFKK/Y)5, then the growth can be decomposed as, 
 
/ / ( ) ( / ) [1 ( )] ( /Y Y A A t K K t L Lα α⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅= + ⋅ + − ⋅ )
}
.  
In other words, the growth rate of aggregate output equals   /A A
⋅
(the growth rate of TFP), plus ), a weights  ( ) ( / ) [1 ( )] ( /t K K t L Lα α⋅ + − ⋅& &
average of the growth rates of the two inputs, where the weights are 
the corresponding input shares. KDI (2003) collated data on the quan-
tities, Y, K, and L, and total labor income for each industry. The share 
of labor, α(t), was computed from total labor income and total value 
added, and the share of capital was calculated as (1- α(t)). As the 
growth rates, , , and  were all directly obtained /Y Y& /K K& /L L&
from the dataset, the only term in growth accounting that could not be  
measured directly was the growth rate of technology, .  Using  /A A
⋅
the equation mentioned above, the growth rate of technology or TFP,  
/A A
⋅
, was indirectly obtained from 
 
/ / { ( ) / [1 ( )] /A A Y Y t K K t L Lα α ⋅= − ⋅ + − ⋅& & & &
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.   
 
In other words, we measured the TFP growth rate — or the rate of  
technological progress — as a residual; we subtracted from  the  /Y Y
⋅
part of this growth rate that could be accounted for by the growth rate 
of the inputs, K and L.6
Table 2 breaks down the growth of value added as contributions 
from TFI and TFP for selected periods.7 For 1985-2001, the average 
annual growth of value-added in manufacturing was 10.60%. While 
the annual growth rate was 15.64% in the late 1980s, it decreased to 
9.40% in the 1990s and then rose up to 17.47% after the crisis. Hahn 
(2003) also points out that TFP for the Korean manufacturing de- 
?
5 For a Cobb-Douglas technology, Y = AKαL1–α, the input shares are constant at α and 1 – α, 
respectively. 
6 KDI’s (2003) study used real values for all the variables, where the base year was 1990. 
7 KDI (2003) also computed TFP using the multisectoral index method as suggested by 
Caves, Chritensen and Diewert (1982) and developed by Good, Nadiri and Sickles (1997). For 
more information, please see KDI (2003). 
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<Table 2> Decomposition of Industrial Growth (selected years) 
year    1985-2001 1985-1989 1998-2001
year  Avg.Annual Growth(VA)   Contribution (%p)   Avg. Annual Growth (VA)  Contribution (%p)   Avg. Annual Growth (VA)  Contribution (%p)  
year                        VA L K TFP TFI L K TFP VA L K TFP TFI L K TFP VA L K TFP TFI L K TFP
Food Prod. & Bev. 5.68 -1.10 6.93 1.01 4.67                    -0.29 4.96 1.01 9.51 0.48 10.37 1.95 7.53 0.14 7.39 1.98 4.72 1.71 3.50 1.42 3.28 0.41 2.87 1.44
Textiles & Apparels 0.00 -4.37 3.97 1.07 -0.18 -0.46 0.28 0.18                 9.29 1.95 12.23 2.86 6.37 1.06 5.31 2.92 6.90 1.36 4.55 4.11 2.72 0.80 1.92 4.18
Paper Prod.,Printing,Pub.                         6.21 0.82 10.13 1.50 4.70 0.48 4.22 1.52 12.00 3.26 12.78 4.35 7.53 1.97 5.56 4.47 8.91 6.93 8.73 0.97 7.93 3.87 4.06 0.98
Chemical Products 10.64 2.69 12.51 1.94 8.67 1.10 7.57 1.97 17.01                7.67 16.65 3.47 13.45 2.92 10.53 3.57 7.31 5.68 4.79 1.91 5.36 2.23 3.14 1.94
Petroleum & Coal 9.00 1.83 15.48 -4.29 13.02 0.14 12.89 -4.02 9.13 0.54             17.77 -6.06 14.60 0.05 14.55 -5.47 4.34 -1.02 5.91 -1.14 5.46 -0.05 5.51 -1.12
Non-metallic Min. Prod. 6.60 -2.18 7.97 3.56 2.99 -1.06 4.05 3.62                 16.46 1.92 11.65 8.47 7.66 0.88 6.78 8.80 9.56 -0.26 0.47 9.34 0.20 -0.15 0.34 9..36
Basic Metals 9.73 -0.12 9.21 2.95 6.72 -0.04                   6.76 3.01 15.33 3.05 16.79 1.64 13.67 0.83 12.84 1.66 5.86 0.84 6.60 0.74 5.12 0.22 4.90 0.74
Metals                       6.92 3.09 8.97 1.08 5.83 2.13 3.70 22.111.09 8.15 16.49 8.12 13.58 4.27 9.31 8.53 5.21 6.62 6.75 -1.33 6.52 4.38 2.14 -1.31 
General Machinery 12.99 3.44 10.88 4.84 8.01                    1.45 6.56 4.98 24.37 9.98 18.49 8.35 15.58 4.23 11.35 8.79 19.82 7.20 8.12 11.23 8.08 2.93 5.14 11.75
Semiconductors                  28.91 7.29 24.25 9.32 19.03 2.73 16.29 9.89 45.51 20.07 29.19 15.37 28.64 10.07 18.58 16.86 20.44 0.44 5.42 16.56 3.42 0.12 3.30 17.02
Electronics & Parts 21.13 3.74 15.77 9.76 10.88 1.61 9.27 10.25              24.27 9.86 27.29 4.25 19.87 4.45 15.42 4.40 38.79 9.84 14.89 22.88 14.02 3.92 10.10 24.77 
IT Equipment 19.96 0.66 8.65 14.01 5.41 0.29 5.12 14.55 28.56 11.13         18.45 11.88 15.89 5.41 10.49 12.67 40.02 7.01 11.20 27.50 10.53 3.08 7.45 29.49
Home Appliances 11.95 0.86 8.52 6.87 4.89                    0.49 4.40 7.06 29.46 16.83 25.52 7.01 22.08 9.00 13.08 7.38 21.79 3.33 5.84 16.55 4.66 2.14 2.52 17.14
Automobiles                    14.56 5.22 16.12 2.98 11.51 2.43 9.08 3.05 27.04 17.21 29.58 2.35 24.64 7.28 17.36 2.40 20.00 1.61 3.12 17.11 2.53 0.78 1.75 17.48
Other Trans. Equipment 10.61 0.82 8.11 5.60 4.87 0.41 4.46 5.74 -6.96 -7.45              1.40 -3.76 -3.26 -3.76 0.50 -3.70 24.57 4.82 1.73 20.77 3.23 2.22 1.02 21.34
Precision Instruments 7.17 0.75 8.16 1.49 5.66 0.26 5.40 1.51 25.01             8.02 23.33 5.81 18.94 3.03 15.91 6.07 -1.06 4.71 -3.15 -0.42 -0.64 1.26 -1.90 -0.42 
Other Manufacturing  4.31 -2.81 6.18 3.29 1.00 -1.27 2.27 3.31                 17.34 3.77 13.78 8.116 8.84 2.13 6.71 8.50 11.92 4.71 7.32 5.46 6.31 2.23 4.07 5.61
Manufacturing                    10.60 0.12 10.40 4.33 6.16 0.05 6.11 4.44 15.64 5.10 15.55 4.14 11.38 2.18 9.20 4.26 17.47 4.34 5.68 11.68 5.37 1.69 3.68 12.10
Source : Rearranged from KDI (2003). 
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creased in 1995- 1998, compared to 1990-1995. These figures support 
Kim (2001) and Kwack (2001) who argue that the competitiveness of 
the Korean economy eroded in the early 1990s, although some fun-
damentals of the economy appeared to be healthy. The resurgence of a 
high growth rate after the crisis is considered to be largely due to the 
death and exits of inefficient firms during the crisis, and the birth of 
young and efficient firms since then, together with the better alloca-
tion of resources. This view is in line with the rapid increase in TFP 
after the crisis, as will be discussed later.8 Overall, machinery, E&E 
and automobile industries experienced higher growth whereas T&A 
did not grow at all. 
Though not reported in Table 2, it is noteworthy that the KDI 
study (2003) revealed that the leaders of growth changed from small 
firms to large firms during this period. 
It is well known that Korea started its economic growth in the 
1960s by concentrating on the industries that had comparative advan-
tage, i.e. simple labor-intensive industries such as T&A. The fast ac-
cumulation of factors is regarded as being one of the most crucial 
sources of rapid economic growth, since the launch of the develop-
ment plans in the early 1960s. Table 2 shows that for most industries, 
both labor and capital input kept increasing during 1985–2001. Three 
more observations regarding TFI and industrial growth are clear from 
the table: 
(i) During the period, industries traditionally using relatively 
more labor (labor-intensive industries) did not grow as fast 
as capital-intensive industries; 
(ii) The growth rate of labor input in each industry overall de-
creased throughout the period in general;  
(iii) The growth rate of labor input in each industry was, in gen-
eral, lower than that of capital. As a result, for the whole 
manufacturing sector for the entire period (1985-2001), labor 
and capital increased by 0.12% and 10.40%, respectively on 
average each year. 
 
As a result, GDP (or manufacturing) share of labor-intensive in-
dustries decreased and the capital-labor ratio in each industry in-
creased. In other words, the whole manufacturing sector was oriented 
towards more capital-intensive industries, and the production tech-
nology for each industry itself became more capital intensive. It is 
noteworthy that the semiconductor industry led the growth of labor 
????????????????????????????????????????????
8 A referee pointed out that the exit and entry are usually observed during the cyclical down-
turns rather than upturns, while the period of 1998-2001 should be regarded as the cyclical up-
turns. The author agrees to her/his opinion. The major reason of TFP growth during this period 
needs more investigation. 
?
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input, recording 7.29% of annual growth of employment whereas it 
also led the increase of capital input with 24.25% of annual growth. 
The growth of TFI became slow after the crisis (1998-2001) compared 
to the late 1980s. The role of capital accumulation has been substituted 
by higher growth rates of TFP in leading the growth since the late 
1990s. 
Table 2 also provides crucial information regarding TFP growth 
and industrial growth. The table shows that the average annual 
growth rate of TFP for the whole manufacturing was only 4.33% for 
the entire period of 1985-2001, which soared up sharply over the cri-
sis; for 1998 – 2001, the growth rate of TFP was as high as 11.68%. Be-
fore the 1990s, the contribution of TFP growth to the growth of manu-
facturing was 27%, which increased to 70% after the crisis. While it 
may indicate that firms improved their production technology, at the 
same time, as suggested above, such a change might be the result of 
inefficient firms not being able to survive the crisis, and as new firms 
with greater efficiency entered the market after the crisis.  
It should be also noted that, in general, the industries that grew 
fast showed high growth of TFP as shown from IT equipment, semi-
conductors, E&P, automobiles and home appliances industries, which 
supports the view that TFP became an important source of growth in 
Korean manufacturing. In particular, in the late 1990s, the growth 
rates of general machinery, E&E and automobile industries were far 
higher than the manufacturing average, where rapid increase in TFP 
was observed in E&E and automobiles.  
In summary, the industries with a relatively large share in manu-
facturing and high growth rate, such as E&E and automobile indus-
tries, led the growth of manufacturing since the late 1980s. It is also 
noteworthy that industries with large firms and high TFP became the 
engines of growth over time, in particular, since the crisis. 
 
 
3. Contributions of TFI and TFP to the Growth of  
Manufacturing Sector 
 
For the period of 1985-2001, the contribution of TFI to growth of 
the manufacturing sector reached about 58.10% while TFP was 41.90% 
(KDI, 2003). TFP contribution was particularly high in IT equipment 
(72.89% or 14.55%p out of 19.96%) and home appliances (59.10% or 
7.06%p out of 11.95%).  Conversely, TFP contribution was relatively 
low in automobiles (20.95% or 3.05%p out of 14.56%) and chemical 
products (18.48% or 1.97%p out of 10.64%). In the late 1990s, however, 
TFP became substantially high in these industries as well; the contri-
bution of TFP to growth increased from 27.24% in the late 1980s to 
69.26% after the crisis (1998-2001) for the entire manufacturing sector 
?
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including industries such as semiconductors (83.28% or 17.02%p out 
of 20.44%), automobiles (87.37% or 17.48%p out of 20%), home appli-
ances (78.62% or 17.14%p out of 21.79%) and IT equipment (73.68% or 
29.49%p out of 40.2%). 
Figure 1 shows the average annual growth rate of some major in-
dustries and contributions from TFI and TFP growth for 1985-2001 
based on KDI (2003). The straight line connecting the same numbers 
in each axis indicates the iso-growth curve, where any point on the  
 
?Figure 1? Decomposition of Contribution from TFP and TFI to 
Growth (1985-2001) 
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line represents the same growth rate. For example, the growth point 
for IT equipment lies around the line connecting 20% growth of TFI 
and TFP, respectively, meaning that the industry experienced about 
20% of annual growth during the period. Furthermore, the accurate 
position of the point explains the contribution of TFI and TFP to 
growth. For instance, the figure shows that for IT equipment industry 
that recorded about 20% of annual growth, 5%p of growth (or about 
25% of total growth) was due to factor accumulation, while 15%p (or 
about 75% of total growth) was due to TFP growth. The figure illus-
trates that while the overall growth rate was the highest in semicon-
ductors, a large portion of the growth was due to factor accumulation. 
The three industries that recorded the highest growth rates (semicon-
ductors, E&P and IT equipment) received a larger contribution from 
TFP in absolute terms. However, in relative terms, the contribution 
from TFP to growth was the highest in semiconductors followed by 
home appliances. The contribution of TFP to growth was relatively 
low for automobiles, chemical products and T&A.  
The dynamics of the growth, as summarized in Figure 2, provides 
substantially different features from Figure 1. The arrows in the figure 
represent the move of the average annual growth for each industry 
from 1985-1989 to 1998-2001. Four findings should be highlighted:  
(i) For all the concerned industries, except chemical products, 
the arrows point in a northwest direction; meaning that over 
the period, the industries’ growth became more dependent 
on TFP growth; 
(ii) The growth points of industries such as IT equipment and 
E&P moved up, indicating that they grew faster in the late 
1990s than in the late 1980s; 
(iii) While the contribution of TFP to growth increased, the 
growth rate of each industry, in general, decreased except for 
IT equipment and E&P.9 KDI (2003) reported that the growth 
rates of the industries were particularly low in the early and 
mid 1990s, up to the crisis. Therefore, these low growths for 
1998-2001 should be regarded as what recovered from the 
growth rates for the mid 1990s; 
(iv) Contrast to our common belief, semiconductors, one of the 
representative exporting commodities of Korea, experienced 
a huge decline in the rate of growth. This decline is found to 
be a result of a decrease in the contribution from factors, 
while TFP’s contribution was still maintained. 
????????????????????????????????????????????
9 While it is not shown in Figure 1, “Other Transport Equipment” recorded 24.57% of an-
nual growth for 1998-2001, from –6.96% in the late 1980s. This is provided in Table 2. 
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III. The Relationship between Industrial  
Structure and Trade Structure 
 
 
1. Changes in the Structure of Trade10
 
For nine years since 1992, the Korean manufacturing sector in-
creased its exports to the world substantially, as summarized in Table 
3. The fastest growing market for Korea during the period was China. 
While Korea’s export of manufacturing goods to the world increased 
11% on average annually, those to China recorded an annual growth 
of about 27%. Korea’s exports to Japan grew slower compared to the 
world, recording an annual growth of 8%. 
Table 3 also shows that most industries in Korea recorded double-
digit growth in their exports to China. In particular, exports of semi-
conductors expanded as much as 85%, IT equipment 48%, and preci-
sion instruments 50%, annually. Korea’s exports to Japan were also 
led by E&E; 22% of annual growth of exports of IT equipment, 20% of 
semiconductors, and 18% of home appliances were observed. How-
ever, the growth rate of E&P is considerably low, which implies that 
the patterns of regional division of trade that Korea imports parts 
from Japan was strong, and it was hard for Korea to penetrate the 
Japanese market with E&P. This finding is consistent with Ko, Cho, 
Lee, Lee, and Lee (2003). While the annual growth of automobile ex-
ports to China increased by 32%, exports to Japan increased by only 
1%. Also, exports of petroleum and coals, chemical products and pa-
per products to Japan recorded relatively high growth rates. 
 
 
2. Revealed Comparative Advantage 
 
The comparative advantage that firms or industries can acquire 
originates in various ways. Lafay (1992) categorizes them as follows: 
i) favorable natural resource endowment of the territory con-
cerned; 
ii) lower relative costs through the choice of segment that are 
best suited to the macroeconomic factors of production; 
iii) lower relative costs through innovation at microeconomic 
level in the production process;  
????????????????????????????????????????????
10 All the trade data used in this section are from KDI (2003), which modified PC/TAS by  
UNCTAD/WTO.  
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<Table 3> Annual Average Growth Rate of Korea’s Exports  
(1992-2000) 
 Korea to China Korea to Japan Korea to world 
Food Products &  
Beverages 0.43 0.02 0.03 
 (1.56) (0.27) (0.26) 
Textiles & Apparels 0.27 -0.08 0.00 
 (0.97) (-1.05) (0.03) 
Paper Products,  
Printing, Publishing 0.20 0.22 0.17 
 (0.74) (2.84) (1.61) 
Chemical Products 0.28 0.10 0.12 
 (1.00) (1.27) (1.09) 
Petroleum & Coal 0.47 0.25 0.24 
 (1.71) (3.27) (2.24) 
Non-metallic Mineral  
Products 0.42 -0.04 0.07 
 (1.53) (-0.58) (0.62) 
Basic Metals 0.09 0.01 0.07 
 (0.34) (0.09) (0.65) 
Metals 0.18 0.09 0.06 
 (0.66) (1.16) (0.56) 
General Machinery 0.31 0.12 0.14 
 (1.12) (1.59) (1.31) 
Semiconductors 0.85 0.20 0.15 
 (3.08) (2.62) (1.43) 
Electronics & Parts 0.41 0.07 0.15 
 (1.50) (0.95) (1.36) 
IT Equipment 0.48 0.22 0.17 
 (1.74) (2.91) (1.60) 
Home Appliances 0.39 0.18 0.10 
 (1.41) (2.40) (0.91) 
Automobiles 0.32 0.01 0.17 
 (1.17) (0.12) (1.60) 
Other Transport  
Equipment -0.11 0.13 0.09 
 (-0.39) (1.76) (0.87) 
Precision Instruments 0.50 0.08 0.09 
 (1.83) (0.99) (0.81) 
Other Manufacturing  0.29 -0.02 0.00 
 (1.05) (-0.24) (0.03) 
Total Manufacturing 0.27 0.08 0.11 
 (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) 
Source : Rearranged from KDI (2003). 
Notes : Numbers in parentheses are the ratio of annual growth rate of each industry's 
exports to that of total manufacturing exports. 
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iv) the acquisition of monopoly elements through the microeco-
nomic creation of new products. 
 
Therefore, changes in both resource endowments and technology 
affect comparative advantage of producers. TFP may be related to mi-
croeconomic innovation in the production process (iii) or product 
creation (iv), and change comparative advantage. This concept of 
comparative advantage is often confused with competitiveness. The 
two essential differences between the two concepts are, according to 
Lafay (1992): 
i) whereas competitiveness is measured between countries, for a 
given product, comparative advantage is measured between 
products for a given country; 
ii) whereas competitiveness is subject to changes in the macro-
economic situation, comparative advantage is structural in na-
ture. 
 
As it is impossible to measure comparative advantage, which can 
be defined in the autarky in a very strict sense, there have been efforts 
in the field of economics to find comparative advantage revealed 
through economic activities, in particular, from transaction of com-
modities between countries. While one of the most significant contri-
butions for these revealed comparative advantage (RCA) was pro-
posed by Balassa (1963, 1979)11, it has been widely criticized that most 
indexes, including Balassa’s, distorted the real figures of comparative 
advantage as they ignore domestic consumption and production (and 
therefore trade balance), and take into account the flow of the relevant 
commodity only (for example, see Ballance, Forstner and Murray, 
1987; Webster 1991). In this regard, RCA index proposed by CEPII 
(Lafay, 1992), which adopted a weighted indicator to reflect the con-
tribution of trade balance and each product’s importance for the coun 
try’s total trade, is recognized as a proper index. This index i kf  for  
industry k in country i (hereafter a weighted RCA index or CEPII RCA 
index) is defined as 
 
i k i k i kf y z= −  
 
where  yik  is balance in relation to GDP (=1000?(Xik?Mik)/Y) 
and zik is attributed balance to industry k  
????????????????????????????????????????????
11 KDI (2003) presents RCA indexes for the Korean industries using the Balassa methods. 
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index for a specific industry is obtained by correcting the conventional 
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where the subscript . stands for the flow of commodities to a refer-
ence zone (such as the world). The RCA status of an industry can be 
classified as: 
 
Country i has RCA in industry k  iff  fik > 0, 
Country i has RCD13 in industry k  iff  fik < 0, 
Country i has neither RCA nor RCD in industry k  iff  fik = 0. 
 
Different from most RCA indexes, the absolute value of this  fik  
can be larger than one. Table 4 and Figure 3 summarize the weighted 
RCA indexes for Korean industries for the period from 1992 to 2000. 
The general trends of the indexes in the table and figure show that, in 
spite of relatively large fluctuations in the indexes for some industries, 
only P&C industry moved from the range of revealed comparative 
disadvantage (RCD) to RCA over the eight years, and semiconductor 
industry is the only one that changed its position from RCA to RCD. 
As of 2000, IT equipment, automobile and T&A industries possessed a 
strong RCA: the indexes for IT equipment and automobile industries 
increased and that for T&A industry decreased dramatically, but re-
maining positive. Overall, in 2000, Korea maintained RCA for seven 
industries – P&C (though very close to zero), T&A, home appliance, 
IT equipment, metal products, automobiles and other transport 
equipment industries. It is worth noting that semiconductor industry, 
which has been regarded as one of the most important exporting sec-
tors of Korea, recorded a very high level of RCA in 1995 and then lost 
its revealed comparative advantage. In 1998, the industry recorded 
RCD first time in the 1990s, and the degree of disadvantage became 
deeper since then. 
????????????????????????????????????????????
12 Y is GDP, X is exports and M is imports 
13 RCD stands for revealed comparative disadvantage. 
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<Table 4> CEPII RCA Indexes for Korean Industries  
(1992, 1996, 2000) 
 1992 1996 2000 
Food Products & Beverages -6.2891 -7.2793 -8.4938 
Textiles & Apparels 33.2642 21.6454 15.1646 
Paper Products, Printing, Publishing -3.1205 -2.3753 -3.8737 
Chemical Products -7.9924 -5.7064 -6.8058 
Petroleum & Coal -3.9165 -1.8785 0.3701 
Non-metallic Mineral Products -1.5673 -1.9944 -1.3128 
Basic Metals -4.2772 -11.4629 -9.5031 
Metals 1.2685 1.0982 1.2282 
General Machinery -27.3191 -31.2455 -14.2997 
Semiconductors 1.3044 8.3993 -8.1473 
Electronics & Parts -2.7402 3.0339 -4.8919 
IT Equipment 13.2469 12.3974 20.0207 
Home Appliances 2.2241 2.9467 2.6003 
Automobiles 7.4267 18.7344 17.6350 
Other Transport Equipment 2.4981 4.7563 9.4857 
Precision Instruments -5.6289 -9.7698 -10.4158 
Other Manufacturing 1.6176 -1.2975 -0.6589 
Source : Calculated from KDI (2003). 
 
?Figure 3? CEPII RCA Indexes for Selected Korean Industries  
(1992~ 2000) 
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[Figure 4] RCA nad RCD for Korea, China and Japan?
?
 
The average RCA and RCD of the Korean industries in the 1990s 
are compared to those of China and Japan in Figure 4.14 Including 
P&C industry, Korea has RCA in seven industries,15 China in eight 
industries and Japan also in eight industries. For three industries such 
as IT equipment, metal products and non-automobile transport, the 
three economies share RCA. In addition to these three industries, Ko-
rea and Japan have RCA for automobile industry, and Korea and 
China share RCA for T&A and home appliances. There is no industry 
that only Japan and China share RCA. In addition, no country has 
RCA against the world for basic metal industry. More findings from 
RCA analysis are summarized as the following. 
i) Excluding P&C industry (where the RCA index of Korea is 
almost zero), at least either China or Japan has RCA for all the 
industries that Korea has RCA. This indicates that all the ex-
porting commodities that Korea has structural strength are 
likely to face challenges from China and Japan in the world 
market. Further, the industries that Korea has RCA consist of 
both labor intensive and capital (or technology) intensive in-
dustries. 
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14 Weighted RCA indexes for China and Japan’s industries are available from the author on 
request. KDI (2003) contains Balassa’s RCA indexes for the industries for the three economies. 
15 In 2000, Korea appeared to have comparative advantage in Petroleum and Coal, where it 
used to have comparative disadvantage. The data indicated a sudden increase in export of this 
commodity group in 1999 and 2000. The reason of this rapid increase needs more investigation.  
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ii) Japan is the only country that has RCA for some capital or 
technology intensive sectors such as machinery, semiconduc-
tor, E&P and precision machinery industries. It also has RCA 
for automobile, IT equipment, metal products and other 
transport equipment industries, for which Korea and/or 
China also have (has) RCA. 
iii) China is the only country that has RCA for F&B and NMMP 
industries. In T&A and home appliances industries, it may 
compete with Korea as both countries share RCA for these 
two industries.          
 
 
3. ESI for Korea-China and Korea-Japan  
 
A variety of indexes related to trade have been developed and util-
ized in the previous literature. These indexes have different defini-
tions and investigate different aspects of trade. This section reviews 
the trade performance of Korea using the index that investigates the 
extent of competitiveness of commodities exported from Korea in spe-
cific markets, in comparison with those from other countries. This in-
dex, labeled as the export similarity index (ESI), quantifies the similar-
ity of trade structures between two countries in the same market un-
der the assumption that the possibility of competition is higher when 
the trade structures for two countries are similar. ESI is computed by 
summing up the minimum values of each country’s ratio of export of 
a specific commodity to a specific commodity group as 
 
ESI = 
1
min ,
kn k
jhih
K K
ih jhk
MM
M M=
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  , 
 
where 
k
ihM  ?market h’s imports of commodity k (in commodity group 
K) from country i, 
K
ihM  =market h’s total imports of commodity group K from coun-
try i, 
k
jhM  =market h’s imports of commodity k (in commodity group 
K) from country j, and 
K
jhM  =market h’s total imports of commodity group K from coun-
try j.16
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16 Accordingly, the industries in subcategories are investigated to calculate ESI. For more 
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In this study, the entire world market is used as a destination. 
When two competing countries in a market are compared, if the index 
is zero for a specific goods, the two countries do not compete for the 
market with the product as one country does not export the relevant 
goods at all. If the index is one, then for each commodity, the trade 
structures of two countries are exactly the same, and they compete 
very intensively. Table 5 shows ESI for each industry in 1992 and 2000 
computed for Korea-China and Korea-Japan. The last row of the table 
presents unweighted arithmetic average of ESI for each industry. 
Therefore, while it can provide a big picture for competition in the 
entire manufacturing sector, it does not tell specific information about 
competition between countries in industries. For example, while the 
ESI for total manufacturing changed more significantly for Korea-
Japan, the changes of ESI for disaggregated industries tell that the 
fluctuation was more serious for Korea-China. The last column for 
each case is the growth of ESI. As of 2000, there was almost the same 
extent of competition measured by ESI between Korea and China 
overall, as in 1992. This finding does not indicate that the competition 
between the two countries was unchanged: there were some substan-
tial changes in competition structure over the period. For example, 
competition between Korea and China in the semiconductor market 
significantly increased from 0.30 in 1992 to 0.68 in 2000 in ESI. It re-
veals that China has already become a competitor of Korea in the 
world semiconductor market as more foreign firms invested and pro-
duced in China. In comparison, competition between the countries in 
automobile industry sharply decreased from 0.43 in 1992 to 0.17 in 
2000. This change implies that Korea’s superiority in automobile in-
dustry has accelerated during the period, and China’s automobile in-
dustry has failed to catch up Korea’s in the 1990s. ESIK-C also signifi-
cantly decreased for NMMP and T&A industries, meaning that Korea 
has lost its competitiveness in these two industries. For home appli-
ances and general machinery, the index stably moved in the range of 
0.50 and 0.65 throughout the period. The change for these industries 
over the period was insignificant, indicating that the competition 
structure for these goods for the two countries did not change notably. 
For E&E industries (except semiconductor industry) such as E&P, 
home appliances and IT equipment, the competition between the two 
economies were overall high showing intense competition has been 
maintained in these industries throughout the period. 
Table 5 also reports export similarity indexes in 1992 and 2000 
computed for Korea and Japan. It is noteworthy that overall ESIK-J 
substantially increased for the period for the two countries from 0.43 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
information regarding sub-industries for each industry, please see KDI (2003). 
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<Table 5> ESI of Korean Industries against China and Japan 
ESIK-C (Korea-China)  ESIK-J (Korea-Japan)   
1992 2000 Change*  1992 2000 Change*
Food Products & Beverages  0.35 0.48 0.13  0.53 0.58 0.05 
Textiles & Apparels  0.54 0.40 -0.14  0.49 0.58 0.09 
Paper Products, Printing, 
Publishing 
 0.49 0.39 -0.10  0.55 0.49 -0.06 
Chemical Products  0.34 0.37 0.03  0.54 0.56 0.02 
Petroleum & Coal  0.39 0.44 0.05  0.65 0.54 -0.11 
Non-metallic Mineral 
Products 
 0.58 0.40 -0.18  0.50 0.60 0.10 
Basic Metals  0.32 0.35 0.03  0.54 0.66 0.12 
Metals  0.61 0.62 0.01  0.44 0.48 0.04 
General Machinery  0.48 0.50 0.02  0.62 0.62 0.00 
Semiconductors  0.30 0.68 0.38  0.82 0.77 -0.05 
Electronics & Parts  0.63 0.57 -0.06  0.55 0.57 0.02 
IT Equipment  0.64 0.69 0.05  0.67 0.69 0.02 
Home Appliances  0.74 0.67 -0.07  0.75 0.71 -0.04 
Automobiles  0.43 0.17 -0.26  0.71 0.88 0.17 
Other Transport Equipment  0.51 0.49 0.02  0.42 0.45 -0.02 
Precision Instruments  0.52 0.62 0.10  0.62 0.64 0.02 
Other Manufacturing  0.51 0.49 -0.02  0.42 0.45 0.03 
Manufacturing  0.42 0.40 -0.02  0.43 0.53 0.10 
Source : Computed and rearranged from KDI (2003) 
Note : * denotes the change of the index. 
 
to 0.53 indicating that competition between them intensified in the 
1990s. The competition became significantly severe for automobile, 
basic metals, NMMP and T&A industries while became less intense 
for P&C, PPP and semiconductor industries. An increase of ESIK-J for 
automobile industry is most dramatic reaching as high as 0.88 in 2000. 
This shows enormous contrast to a sharp decrease in ESIK-C for the 
same industry for Korea and China. For automobile industry, Korea 
far exceeded China and grew up to be a significant competitor of Ja-
pan in the world market. T&A is another industry that shows promi-
nent contrast of ESI between Korea-China and Korea-Japan. While ESI 
for Korea-China for T&A industry decreased from 0.54 to 0.40 in the 
?
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1990s, that for Korea-Japan increased from 0.49 to 0.58 in the same 
period. While it needs further investigation with more disaggregated 
data, nevertheless, it indirectly proves that the Korean T&A industry 
moved its focus from labor-intensive, low-price goods to more tech-
nology-intensive and high-quality goods, and, in consequence, com-
petition between Korea and Japan intensified. While ESIK-J for home 
appliances and semiconductor industries decreased, those for E&P 
and IT equipment industries increased only marginally. For E&P, the 
competition index between the two countries is also very stable 
around 0.55-0.57, and the extent was about the same as or slightly 
lower than that of Korea-China. Nevertheless, the continuous de-
crease in the index for semiconductors and home appliances (1% per 
year respectively) is observed, which might be due to the relocation of 
production bases from the two countries to China.  
In summary, the overall competition between Korea and Japan in-
tensified in the 1990s. Nevertheless, there were substantial changes in 
competition between Korea and China in selected industries. Compe-
tition between Korea and China increased very rapidly in the semi-
conductor industry, due to the catch up process of China. In contrast, 
in the automobile industry, Korea has increased the gap between the 
two countries as proven by decrease in ESIK-C. Korea’s automobile 
industry grew relatively successfully, stably increasing its competitive 
edge against Japan (say 3% per year as measured by the ESI).  
 
 
IV. Effects of TFP growth on Trade 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This section investigates the effect of TFP growth on some aspects 
of trade that the Korean economy experienced in the 1990s. The as-
pects of trade to be investigated include export growth to China and 
Japan (and the world), RCA and ESI. While this section is, in particu-
lar, interested in the effects of TFP growth, the effects of other vari-
ables such as TFI growth and overall industrial growth are also ana-
lyzed. As a result, it will reveal how structural changes in industries 
can be interpreted in the context of international competition and re-
vealed through trade. 
More specifically, this section analyzes the relation between each 
industry’s TFP growth and export growth followed by the relation 
between each industry’s TFI growth and export growth. These will 
show how the export structure of Korea, in particular, exports to 
China and Japan, was affected by the growth of TFI and TFP. Second, 
each industry’s TFP and TFI growths are compared with each indus-
?
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try’s competition against China and Japan. This will reveal how com-
petitiveness of Korean industries in the world market was influenced 
by the growth of TFP and TFI. It is also one of the major concerns of 
this section how the change in RCA is affected by TFI and TFP growth, 
and how it is related to export performance and ESI.     
 
 
2. Growth of TFP, TFI and Exports   
 
Previous sections investigated structural changes in Korea’s indus-
tries in the 1990s, and found which industries contributed to economic 
growth, increasing its share in manufacturing and GDP. The contribu-
tion of TFP and TFI to industrial growth and annual growth of exports 
were also investigated. It is believed that the growth of TFP and TFI 
are related to the changes in Korea’s RCA, growth in exports, and 
competition against China and Japan. Table 6 summarizes the correla-
tion coefficients between the sources of each industry’s growth and 
export growth, ESI changes, and RCA changes.  
First of all, it is striking that the changes in RCA were not contrib-
uted by either source of industrial growth. Changes in RCA are posi-
tively related to TFI growth only (ρ = 0.091), but the magnitude is neg-
ligible. This result cast an important question regarding  
the RCA fluctuation for the Korean industries in the 1990s. The 
RCA index is by definition the measure of comparative advantage 
revealed through trade. If neither TFI nor TFP growth (and even the 
industrial growth itself!) explains the fluctuation of RCA, it indicates 
that domestic consumption pattern also substantially changes and in 
consequence changes in comparative advantage may not be properly 
reflected in trade performance. It needs further investigation whether 
there is any other reason that can explain why the industrial growth is 
not related with RCA in the 1990s. In fact, RCA does not explain Ko-
rea’s export performance to China and Japan. The growth in each in- 
 
<Table 6> Industrial Growth and Trade Performance: Correlation 
Coefficients (1992-2000) 
 CX  JX  WX  
ESIK-C 
(Korea-China) 
ESIK-J 
(Korea-Japan) RCA 
GIP 0.578 0.454 0.498 0.564 -0.242 -0.015 
TFI 0.336 0.436 0.528 0.625 -0.326 0.091 
TFP 0.533 0.282 0.259 0.245 -0.056 -0.014 
TFI-
TFP -0.156 0.116 0.205 0.279 -0.202 -0.124 
RCA -0.052 -0.049 -0.119 -0.138 0.122 1 
?
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dustry’s RCA is not correlated with the growth of Korea’s export to 
the two countries. This finding supports the view that domestic con-
sumption pattern might change substantially during the period. While 
the magnitudes of figures are still small, the changes in RCA is nega-
tively related to ESI for Korea-China (ρ = - 0.138) and positively re-
lated to that for Korea-Japan (ρ = 0.122). It implies that the Korean 
industries, which experienced relatively large extent of RCA im-
provement, faced slightly less competition from China and more 
competition from Japan in the world market. This finding is reason-
able considering that in Korea RCA indexes increased significantly for 
leading industries such as automobile and E&E in the 1990s, which 
were in the frontline of catching up with more advanced Japan’s in-
dustries. 
Second, the table indicates that all correlation coefficients for 
growth in industrial output (value added is used here) and export 
growth are positive. The industries that experienced higher growth in 
output, in general, experienced higher growth in exports to the world 
market, including both Chinese and Japanese markets. It is notewor-
thy that the correlation coefficient between the growth rates of TFP 
and exports (ρ = 0.533) is substantially larger than that between the 
growth rates of TFI and exports to China (ρ = 0.336). In other words, 
the Korean industries with relatively higher TFP growth are more 
likely to increase their export to China compared to those with rela-
tively higher TFI growth. In contrast, the correlation coefficient for 
TFP growth and export growth (ρ = 0.282) is substantially smaller 
than that for TFI growth and export growth for Korea’s exports to Ja-
pan (ρ = 0.436), indicating that Korea’s exports to Japan were more 
closely related to TFI growth rather than TFP growth. This result may 
reflect that Korea has comparative advantage against China in the in-
dustries with higher TFP growth, and against Japan in those with 
higher TFI growth. 
Third, it is also noteworthy that the correlations between the 
growth rate of TFP and exports to China or exports to Japan are larger 
than that to the world. In contrast, the correlations between the 
growth of TFI and exports to China or Japan are smaller than to the 
world. In the world market, Korea’s export growth was more closely 
related to TFI accumulation rather than TFP improvement during the 
1990s. The appropriateness of these analyses may be questioned as the 
industries with higher TFP growth could experience higher TFI 
growth as well. However, the correlation coefficient for TFP growth 
and TFI growth is only 0.142 during the period, showing that the two 
growth rates for each industry are fairly independent. Nonetheless, 
this study also calculates the correlation coefficient between the dif-
ference between TFI growth and TFP growth and export growth; the 
results support previous findings, showing that it is negative for 
?
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growth of exports to China and positive for that to Japan. The indus-
tries with relatively higher TFI growth than TFP growth are more 
likely to penetrate the Japanese market successfully, while they are 
less likely to penetrate the Chinese market.       
 
 
3. Growth of TFP, TFI and ESI 
 
The comparison of the correlation coefficients between the indus-
trial growth, growth of TFP and TFI, and ESI results in some interest-
ing findings. First, the average annual growth rates of industry’s out-
put, TFP and TFI are all positively correlated with ESI between Korea 
and China, and negatively correlated with ESI between Korea and 
Japan. For a Korean industry, which experienced a higher growth in 
industry’s output, TFP, and TFI during the 1990s, competition be-
tween Korea and China in the world market increased (ρ = 0.564 for 
GIP-ESIK-C, ρ = 0.245 for TFP-ESIK-C and ρ = 0.625 for TFI-ESIK-C re-
spectively), while competition between Korea and Japan decreased (ρ 
= - 0.242 for GIP-ESIK-J, ρ = - 0.056 for TFP-ESIK-J and ρ = - 0.326 for 
TFI-ESIK-J respectively). The positive correlations for Korea-China im-
ply that China also increased its exports of the commodities that grew 
rapidly in Korea, and consequently, competition intensified. It is in-
teresting that competition between the two countries has the highest 
correlation with the growth of TFI; the Korean industries, which re-
corded higher growth of TFI had to deal with more intense competi-
tion from China. In contrast, the correlation between the growth rates 
of TFP or TFI and changes in ESI for Korea-Japan decreased for the 
period, indicating that competition between Korea and Japan became 
less intensive in the industries that grew fast in Korea. Three kinds of 
answers, which are completely opposite to each other, may be sug-
gested for the Korea-Japan case: 
(i) Those industries that grew fast in Korea might grow even 
faster in Japan and, as a result, Japanese firms were able to 
capture more of the growing world market; 
(ii) Some Korean industries might completely catch up with 
Japanese industries, which would lead to a decrease in Ja-
pan’s share such as memory semiconductors (in particular 
DRAM); 
(iii) Alternatively, as KDI (2003) points out, the acceleration of re-
location of production bases for these industries to foreign 
countries such as China, would induce a decrease in competi-
tion between Korea and Japan.17   
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17 The three suggestions should be applied with care, especially when TFP is considered, as 
?
????????????????????????????????????????
Second, the correlation between TFP growth and ESI for both Ko-
rea-China and Korea-Japan is weaker than that between TFI growth 
and ESI for both cases. The industries whose growth was based on TFI 
faced more severe competition from China as aforementioned. In 
other words, competition from China was relatively weaker for the 
Korean industries that achieved a high rate of TFP growth. On the 
other hand, competition between Korea and Japan decreased more 
significantly for the industries with a relatively higher growth rate of 
TFI than TFP. In other words, the industries that had more contribu-
tion from TFI growth (than TFP growth) to their output growth faced 
less competition from Japan.  
The size of the correlation coefficients for Korea and Japan requires 
further discussions. First of all, competition between Korea and Japan 
in the world market was not stable in aggregated data for selected 
industries. Nevertheless, the changes of ESI for many industries were 
insignificant. The coefficient for the growth of TFP and change in ESI 
for Korea-Japan is also very close to zero, which implies that TFP im-
provement in the Korean industries may not be sufficient to gain the 
competing edge from Japan in the world market. Over the period, 
while six Korean industries experienced very rapid growth in TFP 
including E&E, automobiles and other transport equipment, only one 
of these six industries, automobile industry, recorded substantial and 
positive increase in ESI against Japan. For most of these industries, 
notwithstanding the rapid growth, Korea still seems to have failed to 
catch up to Japan in the world market except for a few commodities 
such as DRAM.  
In summary, it can be concluded that the Korean industries faced 
challenges from China in the 1990s, where the challenge was relatively 
stronger for the industries with higher TFI growth. This implies that 
the industries that grew fast in Korea based on factor accumulation 
also grew rapidly in China, possibly even faster than those in Korea. 
The overall competition between Korea and Japan in the world mar-
ket became less intense for the Korean industries that enjoyed fast 
growth in TFP or TFI. More specifically, while the effect of TFP is neg-
ligible, competition was significantly reduced for the Korean indus-
tries, which were largely contributed by growth in TFI. This is consis-
tent with the phenomena that Japan has moved from the industries 
dependent on TFI to those dependent on TFP, and left more room for 
the Korean industries supported by TFI growth. The growth of TFP is 
found not to have influenced competition between Korea and Japan. 
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the correlation between TFP growth and ESI growth is almost zero. Also a referee explained that 
the low correlation between TFP and ESI for Korea-Japan might be interpreted that the level of 
competition is structurally independent of TFP, rather than Korea did not gain competitiveness in 
spite of TFP growth. While this argument is plausible, the fact that Korean did not gain competi-
tiveness is still valid. For the reason of insignificant correlation, further analysis is needed.     
?
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The relocation of production bases offshore or relatively fast growth 
of Japan’s industries may be the cause of this phenomenon as dis-
cussed earlier.    
  
 
4. Further Considerations 
 
While this study investigates the growth of industries in Korea by 
disaggregating the sources into TFI and TFP, and analyzes their rela-
tionship with selected trade figures and indexes, there is no reason to 
limit our discussion to only those trade figures used in this study. For 
example, some other trade-related indexes such as trade specialization 
index, or other RCA indexes may provide invaluable information 
from different angles. This study analyzes the relationship between 
industry’ growth, RCA and ESI by investigating correlation coeffi-
cients between relevant figures. More rigorous quantitative analyses 
could be performed when longer time series data and the information 
regarding sources of industrial growth for China and Japan are avail-
able. For example, ESIK-C is considered to depend on variables of the 
two countries, Korea and China, where certain variables such as TFP 
and TFI for China are not available at present. In this regard, to run 
regression using only available data will estimate parameters with 
bias, which will render the entire estimation meaningless. This is one 
of the major reasons that this study does not perform regression 
analysis to find the effect of TFP and TFI on competition. Nonetheless, 
even with the simple quantitative analyses, this study presents many 
interesting results, where most of them are consistent with intuition. 
Omission of discussion on any change in trade policy at Korea’s ex-
port destinations such as China and Japan and the patterns of intra-
industry trade also remains as a limitation of this study in providing 
more affluent and accurate information. Further studies are planned 
for service industries as well as manufacturing industries, and utiliza-
tion of more variables such as TFP, TFI and some trade figures for 
relevant countries including Japan and China will enable a more di-
rect and implicative analysis of the structural relationship between 
Korea, China and Japan. Furthermore, a close investigation of firm 
level data would supplement this study that is based on industry level 
data, as aggregation may distort some real figures. Also, although 
there is a consensus on the stylized fact that TFP or TFI growth causes 
changes in patterns of trade, causality between structural changes in 
production and trade should be further confirmed as more data are 
compiled. 
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V. Summary 
 
?
This study disaggregates the industrial growth that progressed in 
the 1990s in Korea into contributions from TFI and TFP growth by 
using data collated for KDI’s multi-sectoral model. These findings are 
applied to the exploration of the relationship between different 
sources of growth (TFP and TFI) and trade performance, such as RCA 
and ESI. 
In the process of restructuring in the 1990s, it was found that capi-
tal accumulated faster than labor in proportion in most industries. In 
consequence, the entire manufacturing sector was restructured to-
wards more capital intensive, and even the labor-intensive industry 
used more capital-intensive production technology. TFP played a sig-
nificant role in growth for select industries, and a sharp increase in 
TFP was observed in the late 1990s, especially for E&E and automo-
biles. The contributions of TFP and TFI to the growth of industries 
varied considerably across industries. In the 1990s, Korea’s exports to 
China dramatically increased at an average annual growth of 27%, 
which is far higher than the average growth rate of exports to the 
world, 11%.  E&E industries led Korea’s exports, in particular to 
China, recording 40-85% of annual growth. While the industry overall 
led its exports to Japan as well, growth rates were lower, and exports 
of E&P to Japan grew very slowly, 7% per year. However, if these per-
formance are standardized by considering the slow expansion of ex-
ports to Japan, Korea’s exports of IT equipment and home appliances 
to Japan grew relatively faster than those to China. Overall, TFP was 
more closely related to Korea’s export performance to China and TFI 
for Korea’s exports to Japan.  
Furthermore, it is striking that competition between Korea and 
China became more intense regardless whether the Korean industries 
experienced a fast increase in TFI or TFP. For the Korean industries 
that experienced fast growth in TFI, the competition against Japan 
became weaker. The more intense challenges from China indicate that 
some industries, which grew fast in Korea also grew fast, probably 
even faster, in China. The extent of challenges from China was rela-
tively weaker for the Korean industries, which recorded relatively 
higher contribution from TFP growth. While no decisive evidence is 
found for the relationship between the growth of TFP and competition 
with Japan, it was revealed that the industries experiencing the high 
growth of TFI faced less competition from Japan. This pattern partly 
reflects that the industries whose growth depended on TFI accumula-
tion significantly declined in Japan. It is noteworthy that this finding 
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confirms the general concern possessed by the Korean people, from a 
new angle, that the Korean industries are nut-cracked between devel-
oping countries (such as China) and developed countries (such as Ja-
pan). Nevertheless, there is also a mild clue that the Korean industries 
climbed up the ladder to compete the Japanese industries, concentrat-
ing on the industries with higher improvement in RCA. It was found 
that the Korean industries that achieved higher improvement in RCA 
competed against Chinese industries less severely, whereas they faced 
more intense competition against Japanese industries throughout the 
1990s.  
 
?
????????????????????????????????????????
?
?
References 
 
 
Ballance, R., H. Forstner, and T. Murray, T., “Consistency Tests of 
Alternative Measures of Comparative Advantage,” Review of 
Economics and Statistics, February 1987, pp.157-161. 
Balassa, B., “An Empirical Demonstration of Classical Comparative 
Cost Theory,” Review of Economics and Statistics, August 1963, 
pp.231-238. 
Balassa, B., “The Changing Pattern of Comparative Advantage in 
Manufactured Goods,” Review of Economics and Statistics, May 
1979, pp.259-265.  
Caves, D.W., L.R. Christensen, and W.E. Diewert, “The Economic 
Theory of Index Numbers and the Measurement of Input, Out-
put and Productivity,” Econometrica, 1982, pp.1393-1413.  
Good, D., M. Nadiri, and R. Sickles, “Index Number and Factor De-
mand Approaches to the Estimation of Productivity,” in H. 
Pesaran and P. Schmidt (eds.), Handbook of Applied Econometrics: 
Microeconometrics, Vol.II, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997.   
Grilliches, Z., “The Residual, Past and Present: A Personal View,” Un-
published paper, Harvard University, 1994. 
Hahn, C-H., “Entry, Exit and Aggregate Productivity Growth: Micro 
Evidence on Korean Manufacturing,” Economics Department 
Working Papers No.272, Paris: OECD, 1999.  
Kim, I., “Korea’s Growth Potential and Crisis Management,” in I. Kim, 
S. Kwack, and S. Park (eds.), Growth, Productivity and Vision for 
the Korean Economy, Seoul: Pakyoungsa, 2001. 
Ko, I., B. Cho, J. Lee, J. Lee, and H. Lee, Analysis of Division of Produc-
tion in East Asia and Its Implications for The Regional FTA, Col-
laborated Research Series 03-03, Seoul: KDI, 2003. 
Korea Development Institute, A Study on the Competitiveness of the Ko-
rean Industries, Research Report 2003-07, Seoul: KDI, 2003. 
Kwack, S., “Factors Contributing to the Financial Crisis in Korea,” in I. 
Kim, S. Kwack, and S. Park (eds.), Growth, Productivity and Vi-
sion for the Korean Economy, Seoul: Pakyoungsa, 2001. 
Lafay, G., “The Measurement of Revealed Comparative Advantages,” 
in M. Dagenais and P. Muet (eds.), International Trade Modelling, 
London: Chapman & Hall, 1992.  
Leamer, E. and P. Lundborg, “A Heckscher-Ohlin View of Sweden 
Competing in the Global Market,” NBER Working Paper No. 
5114, 1995.  
Solow, R., “Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Func-
tion,” Review of Economics and Statistics, August 1957, pp.312- 
?
??????????????????????????
320. 
Tcha, M., and M. Lee, “The Koran Economy: Triumphs, Difficulties, 
and Triumphs Again?” in M. Tcha and C. Suh (eds.), The Korean 
Economy at the Crossroads, London: Routledge, 2003. 
Webster, A., “Some issues in the measurement of comparative 
advantage,” Applied Economics, 23, 1991, pp.937-948. 
?
